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COMMENTAI
ENTS
ES
ToRTs-STATum-ToRT LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF AUTOMOBILE
LIGHTING LEGISLATfON.-Throughout Canada complex and de-
tailed legislation regulates the flow of automobile traffic, the licen-
sing of vehicles, and drivers, the type of equipment requiredand
other such matters . As one might expect, nearly three million
summary convictions are recorded each year for violations of these
statutes and almost one million of them arise out of moving offen-
ces .' Fortunately, all of these violations do not result in collision,
nor do all of the collisions produce law suits ; nevertheless, a sub-
stantial number of automobile accident actions are concerned with
situations where there has been a breach of some criminal or quasi-
criminal legislation . In these circumstances tort courts are faced
with difficult doctrinal problems in their treatment of the fact of a
criminal violation .2
The judiciary encountered no apparent difficulty in holding
that evidence of a prior criminal conviction for the infraction of a
statute was inadmissible in a later civil case ;' however, the courts
did not go so far as to prohibit the introduction of all evidence of
a breach of one of these statutes . Both the circumstances under
I The Canada Year Book, 1963-64, p . 396, indicates that in 1961, there
were 2,779,000 summary convictions, 1,822,405 of which were parking
violations .
2 See Alexander, Legislation and the Standard of Care in Negligence
(1964), 42 Can . Bar Rev. 243 ; Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action
(1914), 27 Harv . L . Rev . 317 ; Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in
Negligence Actions (1949), 49 Col . L . Rev . 21 ; Lowndes, Civil Liability
Created by Criminal Legislation (1932), 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361 ; Gregory,
Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation (1951), 36 Cornell
L . Q. 622 ; Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in The Law of Tort
(1960), 23 Mod. L . Rev. 233 ; Fricke, The Juridical Nature of The Action
Upon the Statute (1960), 76 L. Q. Rev. 240 ; - James, Statutory Standards
and Negligence in Accident Cases (1951), 11 La. L . Rev . 95 ; Foust, The
Use of Criminal Law as a Standard of Civil Responsibility in Indiana
(1959), 35 Ind . L. J . 45 .
1 Hollington v . Hewthorne & Co . Ltd, 11943] K.B. 587, 2 All E.R. 35
(C.A.), (Careless driving conviction inadmissible in negligence case) . See
comment by C . A. Wright (1943), 21 Can . Bar Rev. 653 ; Jalaka v . Thomp-
son, [19591 O.W.N. 324 (Master S.C.O.), (Assault case). But contra where
defendant pleaded guilty, Ferris v. Monaghan (1956), 4 D.L.R . (2d) 539
(N.B.C.A.) .
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which this evidence will be admitted and the procedural effect that
it will be accorded have been left unresolved . Canadian judges seem
to have held that they would rely on criminal legislation if neces-
sary, but that they would not necessarily do so . In other words,
manifesting their characteristic ambivalence, our courts will some-
times consider evidence of a breach of criminal legislation and
sometimes they will not.4
In deciding what, if any, effect to give criminal statutes, Canad-
ian courts universally proclaim that they are only heeding the
intention of the enacting legislature,' despite the fact thatnumerous
authors' and some judgee have exposed the fallacy of this hypo-
critical quest. Nevertheless, because of the inexplicable reluctance
ofCanadian judges to discuss policy issues candidly, the true reasons
for utilizing penal legislation are normally withheld from our view.
Despite this cover-up, under careful scrutiny one may dimly per-
ceive that the civil courts in these cases are, in reality, advancing
the policies enshrined in the criminal law;' through the imposition
of tort liability, they are encouraging stricter compliance with
penal legislation and affording better protection to society.
On a few rare occasions judicial statements have disclosed this,
as when Justice Idington declared that to permit abreach of statute
to go unrecompensed makes a "hollow mockery" of the legislation9
and when Justice Rand protested'O that if an infringement did "not
call down accountability, the regulation might almost as well be
abolished" . It may be that improved enforcement of automobile
legislation may be encouraged by dangling the carrot of a tort
judgment before would-be informers." The profit motive may
operate here as it does elsewhere in society to spur activity that
might otherwise not have been undertaken . Justice Adamson en-
visioned a kind of partnership between penal sanctions and tort
4See Alexander, loc. cit ., footnote 2.
6 See, for example, Phillips v . Britania Hygienic Laundry Co . Ltd.
[1923] 2 K.B. 832 C.A . (Atkin L.J .) .
6 Malone, Contrasting Images of Torts-The Judicial Personality of
Justice Traynor (1961), 13 StanL L. Rev . 779 ; and see authors cited in
footnote 2 ; A . Linden, Tort Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance (1966), 44
Can . Bar Rev . 25 .
7 Justice Traynor in Clinkscales v . Carver (1943), 22 Cal . 2d 72, 136 P .
2d 77 ; Justice Dixon in O'Connor v. Bray (1937), 56 C.L.R. 464, at p . 478 .
8 Fleming, Law of Torts (3rd ed . 1965), p . 126 et seq. ; Prosser, Hand-
book on the Law of Torts (3rd ed ., 1964), p . 193 ; See also Taschereau J .,
dissenting, in Fuller v . Nickel, [1949) S.C.R. 601, at p . 612.
9 Fralick v. Grand Trunk Railway Company (1910), 43 S.C.R. 494, at
p . 510 .
10 Brooks v. Ward, (19561 S.C.R. 683, at p. 687 (Justice Rand dissented
in part in the decision) . See also Bruce v . McIntyre, [19551 S .C.R . 251,
at p . 254 .
11 Fricke, loc . cit ., footnote 2.
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liability in the enforcement of automobile regulations when he
stated that :12 "Unless judges and juries in both criminal and civil
cases lay more stress on the duty of the motorists and the danger
to themselves and others by the breach of those regulations, and
strictly enforce their observance in the interests of public safety,
serious accidents and loss of life will continue." Thus, tort courts
are, to some extent at least, reasoning by analogy to penal legis-
lation and are applying the "indirect pressure of civil liability
to compel conformance to the legislative rule"."
Another policy rationale favouring the use of criminal statutes
in tort cases is that it simplifies the administration14 of tort law by
particularizing the "featureless generality" of jury verdicts . 15 In
their fearsome task of crystallizing the vague reasonable care
standard, the judiciary welcomes the aid of detailed statutory
commands and relies upon them to determine what is reasonable
in the circumstances." Indeed, some have suggested that this was
the main reason for this course of conduct17 and others have ad-
monished courts to rely upon legislation only in this way," but the
courts have refused to be thus confined, indicating that other policy
factors have entered. Not only should a legislative standard be more
precise, but it should incorporate superior expertise" since legis-
latures have at their disposal more extensive resources than do
judges and juries . A statutory determination should be better in-
formed than a spur-of-the-moment jury verdict.
Moreover, reliance -upon legislative provisions assists the jud-
iciary in controlling the jury," a goal that appears to be gaining
favour these days .21 By instructing the jury to find for the plaintiff
if there has been a breach of statute, the judge is able to guide the
jury more effectively than if his charge merely tells the jury to
decide if there has been unreasonable conduct. Even though the
judiciary may be abdicating some of its own authority in this
process, the legislative branch of government, the democratic one,
12 Voth v . Friesen (1955),15 W.W.R . (N.S .) 625, at p . 628 (Man. C.A.) .
11 Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law (1965), 2 Harv. J. Leg . 7, at
p . 14, reprinted from Harvard Legal Essays (1934) .
14 Foust, loc . cit ., footnote 2 .
11 Holmes, The Common Law (1818 1), p, I 11 .
16 Thayer, loc . . cit ., footnote 2 .
17 Foust, loc . cit ., ibid.
Is Thayer, Gregory and Williams, loc. cit., ibid. See also Fleming, op.cit .
, footnote 9, p . 130.
11 Fleming, op . cit., ibid., p. 135 ; Morris, loc . cit., footnote 2, at p. 48 .
20 Fleming, ibid., p. 135 .
11The use of the jury has been almost eclipsed recently in England, see
Denning M. R. in Ward v . James, [1965] 1 All E.R . 563 (C.A .), Full Court
Special Hearing ; See also Sims v . William Howard, [1964] 2 W.L.R. -794
(C.A .), noted in (1965), 78 Harv . L . Rev . 676 .
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expands its influence accordingly, which is desirable.22 Some theor-
ists have contended that this device may be used to thwart the
improper refusal of juries to invoke the defence of contributory
negligence to deprive a negligent plaintiff of tort recovery in ac-
cordance with the law.13 In Canada, however, this result would not
follow since comparative negligence legislation permits a reduction,
rather than a deprivation, of damages where a plaintiff contributes
to his own injUry .24 In point of fact, the incidence of recovery is
probably enlarged in this way since most Canadian courts do not
permit a set-off in these cases.21
Lastly, the use of penal legislation moves tort law closer to
strict liability 2 l by supplying an additional arrow for the plaintiff's
bow. Not only can he plead common law negligence, but he may
contend that a breach of statute, which may be negligent or not,
caused his injury. This will normally not weaken the plaintiff's case
since, if he fails to prove the violation, he can always revert to an
ordinary negligence theory. In addition, the adoption of penal
standards in negligence cases may encourage prompter settlement
of claims . Uncertainty surrounding law or fact impedes negotiation
and generates litigation ;161 the diminution of this uncertainty with
more precise standards facilitates the settlement process, which
normally redounds to the claimants' favour .
Not all the policy arguments point toward reliance upon penal
legislation in civil cases ; some militate against their use. It is con-
tended that courts ought not to enter where legislators have failed
to tread.27 If the legislature did not impose civil liability expressly,
as they could and have done," it is improper for a court to do so .
It may be that some criminal regulations are hurriedly passed, ill-
considered, badly-outdated, extremely harsh, or politically moti-
vated.19 This argument is particularly apt when one considers the
dozens of inferior legislative bodies disgorging regulations, orders-
in-council, ordinances, by-laws, rulings and the like by the thou-
sands. The purity of the common law ought to be protected from
22 Malone, loc. cit., footnote 6, at p. 783 .
21 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956), p. 998 .
24 The Negligence Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c . 261, s . 4 .
11 See Wells v. Russell, (19621 O.W.N. 521 (C.A.) ; Earl v. Morris, [1950]
N.Z.L.R . 33 ; cf. Wilk-ins v. Weyer, [194613 W.W.R . 418 (Sask. C.A.) .
26 Fleming, op . cit ., footnote 8, p . 308 .
21A A. Linden, The Processing of Automobile Claims (1967), 34 Ins .
Couns . J . 50, at p . 53 .
21 Thayer, loc . cit ., footnote 2, at p . 290 .
11 See, for example, s . 105(l) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1960,
c . 172, as am.
" Morris, loc. cit ., footnote 2, at p . 23 .
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pollution by these frequently uncommon enactments . This argu-
ment, however, assumes that once a court relies upon a penal
provision it will be compelled to follow every relevant criminal
statute in every tort case . This just is not so . The court is always
free -to choose when it will accept a statutory standard and when
it will refuse to do so." Another policy reason fettering judicial
acceptance of legislative provisions is the desire to restrain the
undue spread oftort liability." Implicit in this attitude is the respect
for the idea of no liability without fault. Unless a defendant is to
blame for an accident, he should not have to respond in damages,
whether or not his conduct violated a statute. These are the contrary
policy arguments .
All of these policy objectives must be balanced by the courts in
deciding whether they will rely on a statute. Yet, once they do opt
for the legislation, the problem does not evaporate, there still
remains for determination the procedural effect to be accorded the
fact of the breach, which may be the most difficult task of all .
Judicial discussion of this issue has also been marked by indecision
andlack of candour. Sometimes it is said that there is an action for
breach of the statute,32 or the violation is negligence per se,11 or
primaJacie evidence of negligence," or just some evidence of negli-
gence" or it may even raise a presumption of negligence .3, There
has been no consistency in the treatment of these statutes in Can-
ada ; one day the infraction of a certain statute may be treated as
negligence per se and another day it may be considered only as
prima facie evidence of negligence .37 Nor has there been any ex-
planation of the reasons for this disparate treatment. The English
courts tend to take an "all-or-nothing-at-all" approach to statutes ;
either they declare that the legislature intended to confer a cause
of action for a breach of statute's or they hold that, since only a
public duty was created, there was no intention to impose civil
10 Malone, loc . cit ., footnote 6, at p . 785 .
31 Fleming, op . cit., footnote 8, p. 135, and p. 308 ; See also Maharsky
v. C.P.R. (1904), 15 Man. R. 53, at p . 80 (C.A .) ; Maitland v. Raisbeck,
[19441 1 K.B. 699, 2 All E.R . 272 (C.A.), where the court expressed a
reluctance to make the driver an insurer of defects in a motor vehicle .
32 As in Ritchie et al v . Ptaff, (1954] O.W.N. 865 (C.A .) .
13 See Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co . Ltd., v. M'Mullan, [1934] A.C . 1 .
34 MacInnis v. Bolduc (1960), 45 M.P.R. 21, 24 D.L.R. 661 (N.S . S . C .) .
11 See Prosser, op. cit ., footnote 8, p . 202.
16 Satterlee v . Orange Glenn School District (1947), 29 Cal. 2d 581, 117
P. 2d 279 .
31 Compare McCannell v. McLean, [1937] 2 D.L.R . 639 (S.C.C.), "per
se evidence of negligence" and Keays v. Parks (1950), 27 M.P.R. 296, at
p . 303 .
11 Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co . Ltd. v . McMullan, supra, footnote 33 .
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responsibility." In the former case there is no room for excused
violations, while in the latter, evidence of excuse becomes super-
fluous .
The American courts have developed a rich array of varying
weights that can be given to statutes.10 The most common treat-
ment employed by American courts is that evidence of a violation
amounts to negligence per se, although some courts hold that it
gives rise to a presumption of negligence, prinia facie evidence of
negligence, or even some evidence of negligence. In most cases they
permit violations to be excused in proper circumstances."
Canadian courts appear to oscillate between the English and
American positions without even recognizing this fact . Part of the
problem is that Canadian judges do not admit that it is the court,
not the legislature, that decides when a penal statute will be used
in a civil case. Consequently, they do not realize that some ap-
plicable statutes may be relied upon and others rejected for proper
reasons. Furthermore, once a court invokes a statute, it may give
it great weight or only slight weight for proper reasons. And evi-
dence of excuse may be admitted or not for proper reasons. This
failure to use discrimination and candour has produced an almost
impenetrable fog in the Canadian cases .
Because of the confusion that abounds in the cases, the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Sterling Trusts Cor-
poration v. Postma and Little" merits consideration. The plaintiff
Brown was severely injured and his wife killed when their vehicle,
which was proceeding reasonably on its own side of the highway,
was struck head-on by that of Postma, one of the defendants .
Postma alleged that he had been forced to pull his vehicle over to
his left in order to avoid a collision with the vehicle of the other
defendants, the Littles, which was proceeding in the same direction
as he was. Postma claimed that the Littles' vehicle, inter alia, had
no rear lamps lit in contravention of the Ontario Highway Traffic
Act. The trial judge held both defendants liable, Postma for two-
thirds of the damages and the Littles for one-third . The Littles.
appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal of Ontario but the
judgment against Postma remained undisturbed . The Brown's ap-
peal against the Littles to the Supreme Court of Canada was
allowed in a three-two decision and the case was sent back for a
new trial to determine whether the Littles' rear lights were illum-
11 Phillips v. Britania Hygienic Laundry Co . Ltd., supra, footnote 5 .
10 See Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 8, p. 202 et seq .
41 Ibid., at p. 198 et seq.
42 [19651 S . C .R . 324, 48 D . L .R . (2d) 425 (S.C.C.) .
1967)
	
Comments 127
inated, and if not, whether this was a cause ofthe accident and for
a re-assessment of the damages.
Justice Cartwright, who was amongthe majority andwith whom
Justice Hall agreed, declared that once it was proved that the tail-
light was unlit and that this was an "effective cause" ofthe accident
the defendants were "prim' afacie liable"41 for the damages suffered .
He reasoned that the purpose of the legislation was "the protection
of other users of the highway, particularly the drivers of overtaking
vehicles . Its primary purpose is to prevent the occurence of such a
disaster as that out of which this case arises".44 His Lordship
avoided the theoretical clash over whether this was a species of
negligence action or whether it was a separate cause of action on
a statute .45
Justice Cartwright also felt that it was unnecessary to decide
whether the duty was an absolute one and under what circum-
stances, if any, a defendant could absolve himself of liability when
he has violated a statute. He did, however, give notice that, in his
view, it would be insufficient for the defendant to show that he did
not intend nor know of the breach because, if this would suffice to
exculpate him, "the protection which it is the purpose of the
statute to afford would in most cases prove iflusory."41
Justice Cartwright then purported to resolve the apparent
conflict in two cases decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
the same year . In Falsetto v. Brown47 the Court of Appeal refused
to rely on evidence of a statutory violation while in Irvine v.
Metropolitan Transport Co., Dd48 it did invoke the legislative
breach in imposing liability. Justice Cartwright said that Irvine
'% to be preferred" but he did not go so far as to reverse the Fal-
setto case, preferring to distinguish it on the basis of causation.49
The strange thing is, however, that Irvine did not hold that a
statutory violation amounted to primafacie negligence, but rather
held that the statute created a cause of action .50
Justice Spence, who was also among the majority, echoed the
word formula used by Justice Cartwright when he stated5 l that
"ifthe tail-light were -unlit and such unlit condition was an effective
"Ibid., at p . 330 (S.C.R.) . 44 Ibid., at p . 329 (S.C.R.) .
45 Ibid., at p . 329 (S.C.R.), he discussed the Upson case .
46 Ibid., at p . 331 (S.C .R.) . 47 [19331 O.R. 645 (C.A .) .
[19331 O.R. 823 (C.A.).
49 He, accepted the treatment of the Falsetto case made by Masten J.A .
in Irvine wherehe said that in Falsetto the breach did not causethe accident .
50 See Masten J .A. in Irvine, supra, footnote 48 . There was also a holding
of common law negligence in-the case .
51 See Sterling Trusts Corporation, supra, footnote 42, at p . 348 (S.C.R.).
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cause of the collision, there is prima facie liability upon the de-
fendants . . ." . However, there was less accord over excused viola-
tions, Justice Spence declared52 that he was "not prepared to say
that that liability is an absolute one and that the said defendants
would be unable to discharge it by showing that such condition
occurred without negligence for which they are in law respons-
ible . . ." .
Justice Ritchie and Justice Judson, dissenting, felt that since the
plaintiff failed to discharge the onus of proof resting upon him
with regard to the evidence of improper lighting, his action must
fail for lack of proof.11 Although they said that it was unnecessary
to decide the other points, if it were necessary, they would accept
the analysis of Justice Cartwright ."
The Supreme Court of Canada has supplied the nation with a
formula to use in these cases, but it has not succeeded in solving
the problem for all time. Although Falsetto may not be dead, it
is certainly in its last coma. In future, breach of vehicular lighting
legislation will undoubtedly be used in negligence cases to offer
primafaeie evidence of negligence across Canada, but the meaning
of this phrase is shadowy. It is clear that it is not an absolute duty ;
what remains unclear is the nature of the excuses the court will ac-
cept to relieve the violator from liability and upon whom the onus
ofproofwill rest. Justice Cartwright put very little flesh on the bones
when he suggested that mere evidence of lack of intent or know-
ledge would not exculpate the defendant, and Justice Spence did
not help much by withholding comment on whether evidence of no
negligence would spare the defendant . Implicit in both their
reasons, however, was the notion that it was the violator of the
legislation that had the burden of convincing the court that he had
a valid excuse . The only policy discussion in the case related to
affording better protection for society by more diligent enforce-
ment of highway legislation ; the other relevant policy issues were
ignored by the court, yet they need airing. Lastly, there was no
limt of whether the Supreme Court would follow a consistent line
with all other statutes, or any other legislation, or whether this
decision would be limited to lighting regulations .
One of the major difficulties with these cases may very well be
that the courts seem to feel compelled to treat breaches of all legis-
lation in a consistent fashion. This need not be the case. It might
be preferable on some occasions to ignore a breach of statute, on
52 Ibid., at p. 348 (S.C.R.) . 53 Ibid., at p . 341 (S.C.R.) .
141hid., at p, 341 (S.C.R.) .
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other occasions to impose liability strictly and on still other. oc7
casions to permit certain excuses to absolve the defendant. HOVY7
ever, it is not the varying intentions of the legislatures that dictate
how the statute is to be treated; rather it is the courts' assessment
of the importance of the policies embodied in these statutes that
produces these different results. Nowhere in the Supreme Court
decision, however, is this fact recognized.
An attempt will now be made to analyze the Canadian cases
that involved the breach of lighting regulations to see if anypattern
emerges. An attempt will be made to portray the present posture Of
the law, howit arrived there, andto prophesy the road it will travel
in the future.
Our task would be easier if there were express terms in legis~
lation dealing with civil liability, but unfortunately these occasio
"
ns
are extremely rare. One earlier version of the Ontario Highway
Traffic Act was interpreted in such a way thatany breach thereof
imposed civil liability upon the violator.15 Since the -statute read
that an owner "shall be responsible for any breach of this act"
"the Supreme Court of Canada in Hall v. Guelph Toronto ExpresAs
feltjustified in so holding. Thelegislation was amended soon there-
after to state that the owner would "ihcur the penalties" provided
which event was used by the Ontario Court of Appeal to aid. it in
distinguishing the Hall decision,57 although some other provinces
continued to apply it .58 In the vast majority of penal statutes therg
appear no express provisions on civil liability. When tort lawye~s
search the enactments for clues, they - rarely discover,.any, In
the
light of this sphinx-like response, one might have thought that the
courts would ignore these statutes in civil cases, since one might
fairly say that the legislators evinced no intention that their product
be used by tort courts .19 Nevertheless, judges have relied on penal
legislation in the past and will continue to do so in th6 tuture'in
certain limited circumstances.
First, in order for a tort court to rely upon a criminal statilte
in imposing civil liability, there must be conduct that violate5the
Hall v. Toronto Guelph Express, [19291 I .D.L.R. 375, dealing with
s . 41 (1) of the 1923 statute .
11 Aid.
17 Falsetto v. Brown, supra, footnote 47, relying on 19 Geo. V, c . 69,
s . 9, assented to March 28th, 1929.
511 Connell v. Olson, 1193311 W.W.R. 654 (Man.-C.A.) ; Western Canada
Greyhound v . Trans.-Canada Auto Transport (1952), 6 W.W.R. (N.S .) 695
(Alta S.C.) .
19 See Lowndes and Thayer, loc. cit., footnote 2, and generally .see
MacCallum, Legislative Intent (1966), 75 Yale L.J. 754.
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provision in question." Where there is no violation, the statute
will not normally" be used in affixing civil liability, but liability
may still be imposed for negligence at common law.12 Section 33
of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act" stipulates that "at any time
from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise,
and any other time when, due to insufficient light or unfavourable
atmospheric conditions . . . every motor vehicle shall carry three
lighted lamps in a conspicuous position, one on each side of the
front of the vehicle which shall display a white or amber light
only, and one on the rear of the vehicle which shall display a red
light only . . . and any lamp so used shall be clearly visible at a
distance of at least 500 feet from the front or rear, as the case may
be". The front lamps must produce "a driving light sufficient to
render clearly discernible . . . any person or vehicle on the highway
within a distance of 350 feet"." Certain regulations are set out
with regard to clearance lamps on wide vehicles" and side marker
lamps for long vehicles." Small fines of five dollars and up are
stipulated for any infraction. 67 This sort of legislation is mirrored
across Canada and the United States ."
The person who is alleging that there has been a breach of a
fighting requirement bears the onus of proving this fact" on the
balance of probabilities since there is a presumption that people
obey the law. 70 If the evidence discloses that the lights were con-
structed in accordance with the statute'71 were actually lit7l and
were visible from the required distance'73 the tort court will dis-
miss the claim, unless, of course, there is some other evidence of
',' McKee v . Malenfant, [19541 S.C.R . 651 (Vehicle not "parked" on
highway as required by statute) ; Mamczasz v. Bruens (1964), 43 D.L.R .
(2d) 707 (S.C.C .), (Act applied only to moving vehicles and here vehicle
stationery) ; McLeod v . Dockendorf (1955), 36 M.P.R . 284 (P.E.f.), (Lights
were in fact lit) .
61 On rare occasions legislation is relied upon as evidence of negligence
although there has been no breach because of technical grounds, see Littley
& Brooks v . C.N.R ., [19301 S.C.R . 416, 4 D.L.R . 1 .
62 Kilgollan v. William Cooke & Co. Ltd., [195612 All E.R. 294 (C.A.) .
63 Supra, footnote 28, as amended by S.O ., 1965, c. 46, requiring two
rear lights on new vehicles instead of only one .
Ibid., s. 33(3) . 15 Ibid., s . 33(6) .
Ibid., s. 33(10) . 17 Ibid
"
s . 33(8) and (11) .
61 See, for example, the Motor-vehicle Act, ii.S.B.C ., 1960, c. 253 and
regulations pursuant thereto (4.01-4.22) and California Vehicle Code
(1959), § 24400 et seq., § 24600 et seq.
61 Morrison v . Dunlap, [19591 O.W.N . 164,18 D.L.R . (2d) 393 ; Kuhnle
v . Ottawa Electric Railway, [1946] 3 D.L.R . 681 .
70 Kuknle v . Ottawa Electric Railway, !bid., at p. 688 .
71 Bolton v. Charkie (1953), 8 W.W.R. (N.S .) 412 (Dist. Ct .) .
72 McLeod v . Dockendorf, supra, footnote 60 ; Dawson v. Oberton (1952),
6 W.W.R. (N.S .) 465 (Alta C.A.) .
73 Gillies v . Lye (1926), 58 O.L.R. 560 .
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negligence. Where the statute was directed at moving vehicles, a
stationary vehicle was not in violation thereof14 and, similarly, legis-
lation aimed at vehicles parked on a highway was not breached
when someone stopped momentarily to pick up something.75 On
one occasion there was held to be no legislative infraction because
the statute did not govern the highway in question.76 Moreover,
no tort court would hold culpable any one who failed to have his
headlights burning on a clear, sunny afternoon, or prior to sunset or
after sunrise, unless, of course, the weather was foul. Although
the courts have construed these statutes rather broadly,77 there are
limits beyond which they cannot fairly go. In one case a court did
deny a motorcyclist recovery for not having on his headlight even
though the statute did not apply to motorcycles, but it apparently
believed that this may have been a casus omissus.18
Second, the conduct violating the lighting regulation must be
the cause of the accident being complained of.79 If the proscribed
conduct did not contribute to the accident or if the accident would
have transpired even if the statute had been obeyed, the court will
not utilize the legislative standard . The onus of proving the causal
connection between the offender's conduct and the injury lies
upon the plaintiff as well ."' The cases have not remained without
conflict over the type of proof of causation necessary. Most judges
believe that the mere proof of an infraction will not suffice ; some-
thing more than that is required .81 Evidence is needed that "but
for" the conduct of the defendant this accident would not have
occurred .82 Other judgeO3 are more prepared to invoke "common
experience" and to assume that, if there had been no violation,
the light would in afl probability have been seen and the accident
avoided.14
14 Mamczasz v . Bruens, supra, footnote 60 .
75 McKee v. Malenfort, supra, footnote 60.
76 Callihoo v . Bradbury., [1939] 3 W.W.R. 344 (Alta C.A.) .
77 Clark v . Hetherton, [193011 W.W.R. 165 (Sask . C.A.).
711 Maxwell v . Callbeck, [1939] S .C.R. 440, at p . 444 .
79 Currie v. Nilson (1954),13 W.W.R . (N.S .) 497 .
8 0 Fuller v . Nickel, supra, footnote 9, per Estey J., at p. 606 ; Underwood
v . Rayner Construction (1953), 34 M.P.R . 229 (N.B.C.A.) ; Peloskiv. Park;
[19501 2 W.W.R . 1179 (Sask . C.A .), (defendant under onus of disproof
failed to show lack of light was cause) .
81 See Estey J. in Fuller v . Nickel, ibid. ; Richards C.J . in Underwood v .
Rayner Construction, ibid. ; Laidlaw J.A . in Grubbe v. Grubbe, [1953]
O.W.N. 626 .
82 This is the most common test of causal relationship, Fleming, op . cit.,
footnote 8, p . 177.
83 Roach J.A. in Ritchie v. Ptaff, supra, footnote 32 ; See also Henley v.
Cameron (1948), 118 L.J.R. 989 (C.A.) .
11 See Taschereau, dissenting, in Fuller v . Nickel, supra, footnote 8 .
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Causation doctrine has been relied upon in afew cases to relieve
a violator of legislation from civil responsibility. Where the person
alleging that another person breached a statute has failed to keep
a proper lookout himself, he was held to be the cause of the ac-
cident and not the offender . 81 So too, -where someone stopped "for
the purpose ofrelieving nature"" and left his vehicle with a brighter
light burning than the required reflector, his breach was not the
cause of the collision. 87 Moreover, where the accident occurred at
a well-lighted intersections' or street" or where the offender's
vehicle was actually seen" or should have been seen," no civil
liability flowed . Some of the older cases, decided prior to the
passage of comparative negligence legislation, held that some
accidents were caused solely by the persons complaining of a
breach and frequently rested on ultimate negligence and last clear
chance theories . 12 The more recent cases have wisely tended to
apportion liability in these situations where both absence of lights
and someone else's negligence contribute to collisions." Neverthe-
less, anyone planning to rely on a violation of a lighting statute
should lead evidence not only of a breach but of a causal connec-
tion between that breach and the accident and should be prepared
to refute evidence that he alone caused the accident.
Third, the person relying on the statutory infraction must be
among the class that the legislature sought to protect and must
have been injured in the sort of accident the statute was designed
to prevent." Thus if a pedestrian walked into, or a low-flying
aircraft flew into, the rear of an unlit automobile on a highway, the
court might well deny liability to these claimants since they would
not be among the group of persons that the legislation was sup-
posed to benefit. Similarly, it is doubtful that someone injured in
a head-on collision with a vehicle that had no tail-lights would
recover since the section was aimed at reducing rear-end collisions
"I Valln v. Empey, [19621 1 W.W.R . 381 (Alta S.C.) .
"I Schwartz et al v. Alytruk et al., [1949] 1 W.W.R. 342, aff'd. 2 W.W.R .
208 (Alta C.A.), per Shepherd J ., at p . 343.
87 Ibid.
81 Collins v. Genet-al Service Transport (1927), 38 B.C.R . 512, 2 D.L.R .
333.
11 Peacock v. Stephens, [1927] 3 W.W.R . 570 (Sask . C.A.).
90 Morrison v. Ferguson (1930), 1 M.P.R . 81 (N.S.C.A.) .
11 Holgate v. Canadian Tumbler (1931), 40 O.W.N. 565 ; Antoine v.
Laroeque, [19541 O.W.N. 641 (H.Q.
12 See, for example, Peacock v. Stephens, supra, footnote 89, and Col-
Uns v. General Service Transport, supra, footnote 88 .
" See for example Underwood v. Rayner Construction, supra, foot-
note 80.
94 See generally, Fleming, op . cit., footnote 8, p . 133 ; Prosser, op . cit.,
footnote 8, p. 193 et seq.
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not head-on ones . In short, the normal limitation of proximateness
applies here as it does elsewhere. ~ i
Whenever a claimant is able to prove that the defendant was in
breach of a tail-light statute which proximately caused lum injury,
he is virtually assured of some tort recovery . This does not mean,
however, that the court will always hold the defendant absolutely
liable for a violation; true, in some cases statutory liability. or
negligence per se language is employed, but in others . the courts
speak ofprimaJacie liability or they merely assume ttiat.the breach
of statute is negligence without explaining or particularizing. There
are apparently no tail-light cases where a court has hel&that proof
of an infraction was merely evidence of negligence for -the judge
or jury to consider. In alarge number of cases the person in breach
of statute was held only partially to blame -and a few violations
were excused.
These variations in wording are by no means inconsequential ;
they reflect differences of some substance in the use made of legis-
lative infractions, although occasionally they are produced by
carelessness ofjudicial expression . As Fleming has said of res ipsa
loquitur,95 a statutory violation may whisper negligence or it, may
shout it aloud. In other words, the fact of a breach may be given
more or less weight depending on the circumstances andthe statute-.
Although the differences in procedural effect given to this evidence
is sometimes scoffed at," trial lawyers recognize the value ofhaving
the burden of proof on the other side and take advantage of this in
their settlement negotiations which, after all, is the ultimate desti-
nation of the vast majority of the automobile cases that are com-
menced .97 Another advantage of having different effects given to
different statutory infractions is that the court will thereby secure
more maneuverability . A judge will be free to decide himself that
negligence has been proved, he may put the entire question to the
jury or he may seek the jury's assistance only on the question of
excused violation.
There are four alternative procedural results possible when a
legislative infraction is relied on in a civil case."" The first, and least
"
Op . cit ., ibid., p . 288 ; See also Prosser, op. cit., ibid., p . 234 ; Alexan-
der, loc . cit., footnote 2, at p . 272 and MacInnis v . Bolduc, there cited,
, yupra, footnote 34.
91, Prosser, op . cit ., ibid., p . 202 precisely the same result .
appears to be reached in presumption States as in negligence per se States .
17 See A . Linden j Osgoode Hall Study on Compensation for Victims of
Automobile Accidents (1965) . See also A . Linden, Peaceful Coexisten'ce
and Automobile Accident Compensation (1966), 9 Can . Bar J. 5, at p . 9. .
11 See Foust, loc. cit., footnote 2, at p. 60, for an excellent discussion
of this problem.
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effective one, is that the fact may be treated as some evidence of
negligence that the jury may, if it so wishes, assess in deciding the
negligence question. At the least, this approach gets the claimant
to the jury and avoids a non-suit . The second way of handling this
evidence is to hold that it entitles the plaintiff to judgment, if the
defendant offers no evidence to explain his breach or if he fails to
raise a reasonable doubt. If the defendant explains his conduct so
as to create a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to the verdict." The
third method that may be utilized is that the evidence of breach
entitles the plaintiff to ajudgment unless the defendant convinces
the court that he was not negligent. This result shifts the onus of
proof to the defendant and he must go farther than merely raise a
reasonable doubt ; he must tip the scales in his favour before he
may succeed."' The last way of using a breach of a statute is to
hold that it is conclusive of negligence and to reject all evidence to
the contrary, which is the traditional negligence per se approach."'
The picture is, unfortunately, even more complex than this, be-
cause the evidence of excused violation may or may not be ad-
mitted for jury consideration in each of the above situations . One
might conclude that the judge must preside over the trial like an
orchestra conductor conducts a symphony concert. He may call
upon one technique or another, a flute or a trumpet, depending
on the type of legislation and the circumstances of the breach .
Seldom, however, have our courts been successful in producing
music ; instead discordant sounds have rent the air and filled the
law reports . Let us now examine the weight that Canadian courts
have given to statutory infractions in the lighting cases to see if any
trend can be discerned .
At one time evidence of a violation of the tail-light section was
said to impose "unrestricted and absolute liability on the owner"J"
When the legislation upon which this decision was amended, the
Ontario courts faltered,"' but the seed found fertile ground in the
West. In Manitoba it wasproclaimed'" that "the statutory duty was
"This is called a "presumption" or a "rebuttable presumption" by
some evidence scholars . See Morgan, Some Observations Concerning
Presumptions (1931), 44 Harv . L . Rev. 906 ; Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise
on Evidence at Common Law (1898), p . 336.
100 Compare with s . 106 of the Highway Traffic Act, supra, footnote 28 .
See also Winnipeg Electric v . Geel, [19321 A.C . 690, per Lord Wright .
101 Foust, loc . cit ., footnote 2, at p . 59 et seq.
102 Hall v . Toronto Guelph Express, supra, footnote 55, at p . 389, per
Anglin C.J.C. ; see also Fralick v . Grand Trunk Railway, supra, footnote 9 .
101 Falsetto v . Brown, supra, footnote 47 .
101 Connell v . Olson, supra, footnote 58 .
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absolute" and an Alberta court declared 01 that there was "a very.
definite duty to ensure their vehicles shall be visible to other drivers~.
on the highway" . The Ontario courts soon recovered and statedl~l
that breach of the lighting section was "per se evidence of negli-
gence" and that a violation of a "statutory duty"101 createdacause
of action ."' Often courts impose liability in statutory violation
cases without articulating the persuasive value given to this fact'01,
or stating that it is unnecessary to do so . 110 Frequently the judge
merely states that the breach of the statute amounted to negligence
without disclosing whether the breach alone was conclusive or
whether he was relying upon the breach as well as other evidence.
in deciding the negligence issue."' There was little policy discusm
sion until Justice Rand"' explained that "the scandal ofthe ravages.
of our holidays . . . is more than sufficient jpstification for the in-
sistence on the drastic measures to which our highway authorities~
have been aroused" . In one case'13 the court declared that "the act
was passed for the purpose of preventing exactly what happened
in this case", and in another,'" where vehicles were customarily
being parked on the side of snow-covered highways, a judge re-
monstrated that the "highways were never intended to be used for,
garages" . It is relatively clear that the civil courts were influenced
in these cases by the compelling policy of accident prevention to
accord great weight to the infractions of the rear-light section, the
effect of which was a tendency to use the fourth method of statu-,
tory treatment, the negligence per se approach.
There is another group of cases where courts have .stated that
violation ofa tail-light statute isprimafacie evidence of negligence','
105 Western Canadian Greyhoundv . Trans-Canada Auto Transport, ibid.,
at p . 697, per Egbert J .
106 McCannell v. McLean, supra, footnote 37i at p . 641 .
107 Ritchie v . Ptaff, supra, footnote 32.
108 Irvine v . Metropolitan Transport Co ., supra, footnote 48, at p'. 694 .
119 Jackson v . Joel, [1948] 1 W.W.R. 156 ; Meth v . Melinsky; [1- 9411
3 W.W.R . 779 (Sask. Dist . Ct.). ; Smorlie v . Harvey et al., [1939] 2 W.W.R .
344 (Alta S.C .) ; The King v . Maracle, [1949] 1 D.L.R . 673 (S.C.C.) .
. 11 0 Schultze v. Endel, (1940) 2 W.W.R . 497 (Sask. C.A.) .
W Fellows v. Majeau, [1945] 2 W.W.R . 113 (Alta S.C .) ; Rubin v . ~
Steeves (1951) 28 M.P.R . 421 (N.B.C.A.) ; The King v. Demers, [19351 3D.L.R . 561 (S .C.C .) ; Billings v. Mooers, 1193714 D.L.R. 518 (N.B.C.A .) ;
Jordan v. Fitzgerald, [1949] O.W.N . 730 (H.C.).
112 Bruce v . McIntyre, supra, footnote 10, at p . 254.
I's Atwood v. Lubotina (1928), 40 B.C .R. 446, at p . 447, per Macdonald
C-J.A.
114 Drewry v. Towns, [1951] 2W.W.R . (N.S .) 217, at p. 221, per Kelly J.
115 Keays v . Parks, supra, footnote 37 ; Ward v . Regina, [19541 Ex . C.R-.
185, reversed on other grounds (1956] S.C.R . 683 ; Dugasv. LeClaire (1962),
32 D.L.R. 459 (N.B.C.A .) .
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or prinza facie a tort . 116 In this series of cases, now brought to
prominence by the Sterling Trusts Corporation decision, a finding
of negligence is not conclusive and evidence of justification or
absence of negligence will be admitted, although it remains unclear
whether, in order to succeed, the defendant must balance the scales
or tip them in his favour . These latter choices are the second and
third methods of handling an infraction. The debate in the years
to come is destined to focus on the relative merits and demerits
of these techniques.
There do not appear to be any cases where breach of a tail-
light provision was relied upon only as some evidence of negligence,
indicating that Canadian courts have accorded this legislation
substantial respect. On occasion, however, the issue of negligence
appears to have been put to the jury for decision."' In these cases
there is presently a distinct trend toward splitting liability between
the violator and the other person"' who may not be looking, 119
driving too fast"' or in breach of some statute as well . 121
A similar pattern of handling violations is discernible in the
cases where the claimant established the breach of a headlight
provision . Whatever treatment is given to the infraction procedur-
ally, the violator rarely escapes civil liability, although frequently
responsibility is divided between him and the other person.122 The
cases involving breach of headlight sections are richly varied .
Since headlights permit a driver both to see and to be seen, the
accidents generated will include those where others collided head-
on with an offending vehicle, where the driver was unable to see
adequately into the distance and where dazzling lights blinded one
of the parties to a collision.
Here, too, in most of the cases the violation of a statute is given
great weight. Typical of the strict view is the case of Wilkins v.
Weyer"' where the court held that a person whoviolated the statute
by having only one headlight burning was negligent per se. In Nes-
116 Strelloff v . Chernoff, [195011 W.W.R . 643 (Sask. C.A .), at p . 647.
117 Kuhnle v . Ottawa Electric Railway, supra, footnote 69 ; Fralick v .
Grand Trzink Railway, sitpra, footnote 9 ; McFadden v . McGillivray, [1940]
S.C.R . 331, 2 D.L.R . 351 .
118 Dugas v. Le Clair, stipra, footnote 115 .
119 Ibid. ; See also Carlson v . Chochinov, [1947] 1 W.W.R . 775 ; The King
V . Maracle, stipra, footnote 109 ; Jackson v . Joel, supra, footnote 109 .
120 Jordan v . Fitzgerald, supra, footnote 111 .
121 Ritchie v . Ptaff, snpra, footnote 32.
122 For example, Voth v . Friesen, snpra, footnote 12 ; Wilkins v . Weyer,
supra, footnote 25 ; Casselman v . Sawyer, [1954) O.W.N. 50 (C.A.) ; Where
a plaintiff bicyclist is the violator the court may blink at it, see Davis v .
Hall et al, [1956] 1 W.W.R. 419 .
123 Ibid.
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hitt v. Carney,124 Justice Martin declared that "It is negligenceper se
to operate an automobile without complying with the statutory
requirements as to lights . . ." since to do so was a "menace" .125
In Voth v. Friesen121 a defendant, who continued to drive while
being unable to see two hundred feet in front of him because of
blinding lights, was held liable for breach of statutory duty . Justice
Adamson revealed the attitude of the court when he stated : "The
many deaths and the great damage caused by motor traffic can
only be minimized by motorists recognizing the necessity of strictly
discharging their duty in driving motor cars . This they will not do
unless the courts insist on strict compliance with the duty which
is on every motorist to take care and to comply with the regula-
tionS11 .127
A small cluster of cases have held that driving with "bum"
headlights,128 with low beam instead of high,129 without any head-
lights on at all"' was negligent without particularizing the pro-
cedural effect granted the violation . 131 There do not appear to be any
cases where the breach of a headlight statute amounted merely
to prima facie evidence of negligence or some evidence of negli-
gence, 111 indicating once more that courts pay heed to the policy of
accident prevention enshrined in these statutes . Headlight infrac-
tions seem to be treated even more stringently than do tail-light
ones, perhaps because the driver is more likely to have knowledge
of a defective headlight than a tail-light. It may also be that,
because head-on collisions are potentially more serious, the court
is imposing a heavier obligation upon the driver as is customary
in situations of grave risk of harm. Whether this will persist after
Sterling Trusts Corporation is as yet unsettled..	It now appears as though certain excuses will be available -to
anyone who violates a lighting statute in most situations . Even in
the cases that held breach of statute conclusive of negligence, it
was recognized that it was possible to excuse a violation. For
example, in Hall"' the court recognized that if the breach Were
124 [193013 W.W.R. 504 . 125 Ibid., at p . 509 .
126 Supra, footnote 12. 127 Ibid., at p. 628 .
128 Norris v . Fiveland et al, [1949) 2 W.W.R . 1104 (Alta C.A.).
129 Casselman v. Sawyer, supra, footnote 122.
110 Fellows v . Majeau, supra, footnote I 11 .
M R. v . Lightheart, [19521 Ex. C.R . 12 .
112 In Bennett v. Gardewine, [194812 W.W.R . 474 (Man . K.B.) Justice
Adamson only made a slip of the tongue, it is submitted, when he stated
that a breach is "evidence of negligence" since this result would be incon-
sistent with the rest of his reasons and his later reasons in Yoth v . Friesen,
supra, footnote 12 .
133 Hall v . Toronto Guelph Express, supra, footnote 55 .
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brought about by an Act of God it might be excused . This should
not surprise us for even in Bylands v. Fletcher"' cases, various
defences like act of third party, vis major, consent, legislative auth-
ority and others were available. The courts have, however, limited
the scope of these excuses providing relief only in rare cases. It may
become even more difficult in the future for an offender to satisfy
a court that he has a justifiable excuse for the violation and with
some statutes this opportunity may be precluded altogether . For
example, it would be impossible to excuse the presence of badly
worn tires on a vehicle."' In one case an offender who had been
injured"' and one whose vehicle had become disabled 137 were not
excused from complying with the dictates of the lighting legislation .
Moreover, this decided reluctance of courts to permit excuses has
led to the view that the offender is the one who must adduce the
evidence of excuse,"' although it is still uncertain what strength
that evidence must have.
One obviously permissible excuse is where the violator of a
lighting statute has substituted equally effective or superior lighting
equipment . Here the statutory purpose is not subverted by the
breach but reinforced. The authority"' to the contrary should be
limited to the situation where the replacement is less effective than
the legislative equipment. Therefore, where a white, but more
powerful rear fight was used instead of a red one as required,140
where clearance lights with equivalent brightness to the absent
tail-lights were on,141 and where a bright light was burning at the
back of a vehicle instead of the reflectors prescribed, 142 violations
were excused.
The excuse of ignorance of the violation is not as easily dis-
posed of. It is clear that there need be no mens rea or wilful breacf,143
1-4 See Fleming, op. cit., footnote 8, p . 299 et seq.
135 Foust, loc. cit ., footnote 2 .
136 Jackson v . Joel, supra, footnote 109 .
137 Holychuck v . McCallum, [1949) 2 W.W.R . 720, aff'd, [1950] 1 W.W.R .
672, (Alta), (Driver failed to put out a flare when left to seek help) .
138 The cases on this appear to conflict, cf. Irvine v. Metropolitan Trans-
port Co. Ltd., supra, footnote 48, and Sterling Trusts Corporation, supra,
footnote 42 .
139 Fralick v. Grand Trunk Railway, supra, footnote 9, where the court
stated that the offender who substitutes "takes the risk of all injuries which
observance of the statute would probably have prevented", per Anglin J .
140 McCallum v. Tetroe et al (1958), 25 W.W.R . 49 (Man . C.A.) ; Han-
charuk v . Smilsky, [194211 W.W.R . 317, per Donovan J .
14, Tinting v . Bauch (1952), 59 Man. R . 310, per Kelley J .
142 Schwartz et al. v. ]~Iytruk et al., supra, footnote 86 (not cause) .
141 R. v. Costello, [1932) O.R. 213 (C.A.), (dealing with the mental re-
quirement for criminal negligence) .
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nor is it necessary to prove an intentional violation'" to secure the
benefit of the infraction in a tort case . But the more common
question of mere lack of knowledge poses more difficulty, since
courts understandably have manifested a suspicion toward such a
defence. Proof that the violator was unaware of a breach has been
rejected as a valid excuse, 141 and the decisions to the contrary 146 are
probably no longer trustworthy.147 It may be, however, that if the
defendant convinced the court that he reasonably believed that
the light was burning1411 or that it had just gone out prior to the
accident ,49 and he was doing everything in his power to repair it,"'
he may be exonerated from civil liability. A fine distinction may be
drawn here between the positive proof'of belief, on the one hand,
and the negative evidence of unawareness on the other hand.
Moreover, sudden lamp failures resemble somewhat the Act of
God notion that might be acceptable as an excuse ."' The court
wisely requires more ofthe defendant that a shrug of the shoulders
and a statement that he did not know the light was out. Further
details of the circumstances in which this defence and others will be
permitted await clarification .
In conclusion, it cannot be denied that the Sterling Trusts Cor-
poration"' decision is a landmark case in the march toward a more
sensible approach to criminal legislation in tort litigation . In
eclipsing the Falsetto v. Brown"' decision, the Supreme Court of
Canada has committed itself to relying on penal statutes to some
extent in civil cases. It has openly lent its weight to the advance-
ment of the policy of accident prevention embodied in highway
traffic legislation . It has not so openly broadened the incidence of
tort recovery and simplified to some degree the administration of
tort trials . There has been no departure from the normal require-
ments of proof of breach, causation and proximate cause as pre-
requisites of adopting statutory standards. With regard to the
1'4 Sterling Trusts Corporation v. Postma and Little, supra, footnote 42,
per Cartwright J.
145 Connell v . Olson, supra, footnote 58, at p. 656, per Richards J.A . ;
Nesbitt v . Carney, supra, footnote 124, at p . 509 .
146 Falsetto v. Brown, supra, footnote 47 ; McLeod v. Lee, supra, foot-
note 60 ; Currie v.' Nilson, supra, footnote 79 (Judicial notice taken that
could drive without headlight without knowing and three month old truck
involved) .
147 Since the decision in Sterling Trusts Corporation v. Postma and Little,
supra, footnote 42.
148 Clark v . Brims, [1947] 1 All E.R . 242 (K.B.D.) .
1 ' 9 Maitland v. Raisbeck, supra, footnote 31 .
110 Brown v . Bulger, [193814 D.L.R . 708 (Man. C.A .) .
"'See Hall v . .Toronto Guelph Express, supra, footnote 55 .
112 Supra, footnote 42 . 15 -1 Supra, footnote 47,
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procedural effect to be given to a violation, the court did not com-
mit the error of adopting too rigid an approach but rather pre-
ferred flexibility. The word formula enunciated, prima facie
evidence of negligence, is both familiar and workable .
Nevertheless the Sterling Trusts Coiporation decision left many
questions unanswered. The Supreme Court did not explain what
it meant by primafacie evidence of negligence nor what procedural
effect it would have . It did not clearly define which excuses wouldbe
tolerated nor who had the onus of proof with regard to them.
Neither did the court fully discuss all of the policy issues inherent
in their choice and the priorities accorded them . Nor did the
Supreme Court indicate how far their decision would extend,
whether to tail-light cases alone, to all lighting cases, to all equip-
ment cases or to all violations of statutes . All of these questions
were left for the future. The Sterling Trusts Corporation decision
is, therefore, extremely significant for what it has decided ; how-
ever, it may be even more significant because of the gaps that
remain unfilled .
ALLEN M. LINDEN*
CONFLICT OF LAWS-VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE
BAsED ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUND NOT RECOGNIZED IN ENGLISH
LAW AT TIME WHEN OBTAINED-SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN ENGLISH
LAw-RETROsPECTIVE OPERATION OF Travers v. Holley'-PuBmc
POLIcy.-At the end of the nineteenth century, English courts
became fully committed by judicial decision to the view that the
only domicile of a married couple is that of the husband. Further,
a marriage could only be dissolved in England if the husband was
domiciled there at the time at which the proceedings were coni-
menced .1 In selecting the domicile of the husband as the sole basis
of jurisdiction, English judges were actuated by the belief that all
other civilized countries had adopted the same criterion and that,
since a husband can only have one domicile at a time and his wife
shares it, there could be only one court in the civilized world com-
petent to dissolve a marriage at any given time .
*Allen M . Linden, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Visiting Professor of
Law, University of California, Berkeley (1966-67) .
'[19531 P . 246, [195312 All E.R . 794 (C.A.).
2 Le Afesurier v. Le Mesurier, [1895] A.C . 517, 11 T.L.R . 481 (P.C .).
The 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act, 20 & 21 Vict ., c . 85, which bestowed
upon an English court the power to dissolve marriages made no express
provision as to what marriages it could dissolve .
